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The need for totally secure communication between the nodes in a network has led to 
many key distribution schemes. Blom’s scheme is a prominent key exchange protocol 
used for sensor and wireless networks, but its shortcomings include large computation 
overhead and memory cost. The main goal of our work is to find ways to overcome the 
shortcomings of the existing Blom Scheme and make it more efficient. In this thesis, we 
propose an efficient key management scheme by generati g new public and private keys. 
We also focus on making Blom’s scheme, dynamic by randomly changing the secret key 
that is generated by the base station and also using mesh array for matrix multiplication 
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1.1 Sensor Networks and Key Management 
Sensor networks are dense wireless networks of small low cost sensors, which collect and 
disseminate environmental data. Recent improvements electronic and computer 
technologies, have paved the way for the proliferation of wireless sensor networks 
(WSN). These sensors are used to collect environmental information and they have been 
considered for various purposes including security monitoring, target tracking and 
research activities in hazardous environments. Each sensor node is battery powered and 
equipped with integrated sensors, data processing capabilities, and short-range radio 
communications. Examples of sensor network projects in lude Smart Dust [1] and WINS 
[2].  To achieve security in wireless sensor networks, it is important to be able to encrypt 
and authenticate messages sent among sensor nodes. Key management[17] [18] is a very 
important security issue in wireless sensor networks. Authentication and confidentiality 
protocols require an agreed key between the nodes and security of the communication 
depends on the cryptographic schemes employed. Different Key management schemes 
have been developed for authentication and confidentiality purposes. Symmetric 
algorithm base key management protocols are use in wireless sensor networks [3] 
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because key management protocols based on public keys ar  inefficient due to resource 
limitations and lack of security in the sensors. 
The main challenges of the sensor nodes are as follows: 
 Once deployed, sensor networks have no human intervention. Hence the nodes 
themselves are responsible for reconfiguration in case of any changes. 
 In order to make optimal use of energy, communication should be minimized as 
much as possible because the sensor nodes are not co nected to any energy 
source. There is only a finite source of energy, which must be optimally used for 
processing and communication.  
 It is required that a sensor network system be adapt ble to changing 
connectivity as well as changing environmental stimul . 
The examples of possible applications of sensor networks include: 
 Sensors are attached to taxi cabs in a large metropolitan area to study the traffic 
conditions and plan routes effectively. 
 Sensor networks are used in military to detect, locate or track enemy movements. 
 Sensor networks can increase alertness to potential terrorist threats. 
1.2 Security Requirements in Sensor Network  
Sensor networks have various requirements [4]:  
A. Integrity: Integrity refers to unmodified data. Data integrity ensures that the data 
received is not altered or modified by any adversary and is same as the data sent by the 
sender node. Integrity of data is achieved by using various cryptographic methods.  
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B. Authentication: It is important as the receiving node must be ensured that the 
received is from a trusted source and not from the adversary.  
C. Confidentiality: The data being sent should be received only by the intended receiver 
and should not be exposed to any other node. Hence data travels in a highly secure and 
encrypted mode.  
D. Availability, reliability and resiliency: It ensures proper connectivity of the nodes 
and that the data and information is available to access at all times whenever and 
wherever required by the authorized nodes. This ensur s protection from attacks such as 
denial of service attacks etc. It also ensures thate data packet is delivered to its 
destination.  
E. Data freshness: Data freshness ensures that the data and informati n being delivered 
is fresh and recent. This is one of the most important security aspects as the adversary can 
send old message and thereby the recently detected da a is not communicated. 
1.3 Sensor Network Constraints 
In order to perform better in terms of accuracy, reliability and security there are some 
limitations that need to be overcome .Some of the limitations are:  
A. Energy: Sensor network consists of tiny sensors which run on batteries. These 
batteries have limited power supply. Hence there comes the need to conserve energy and 
transmit data efficiently without consuming much energy.  
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B. Computation: Due to energy constraints, sensors are also limited by low 
computational capacity. Hence algorithms which require large computations must be 
avoided to incorporate in sensor networks.  
C. Communication: Sensors are linked via wireless connection and therefore, the 
bandwidth is often limited. This also limits the transmission of data and information.  
1.4 Main Objective of our scheme 
In this thesis, we propose an efficient key management scheme. The main contributions 
of this paper are as follows: 
• Reduce the computation and memory overhead. 
• Use of mesh array for matrix multiplication [5]. 
• Making the Blom’s scheme dynamic in order to ensure secure communication 







REVIEW OF LITERATURE 
 
2.1 Related Work 
Key management protocols can be based on either symmetric or asymmetric management 
functions. But due to the scarcity of the resources, protocols based on public keys are 
inefficient. Hence, symmetric algorithm based key management schemes are favored in 
WSNs [6]. Key management in sensor network includes:   
1) Key set up: It is a process of generating keys by a central authority or by individual 
nodes.  
2) Key distribution: It refers to the distribution of keys among the sensor nodes in case 
key is set up by a central authority.  
3) Key revocation: It is the process of removing the key from nodes after the data has 
been transmitted or after a fixed interval of time.  




• The online key management system proposed in [7] is one of the simple and 
easy ways of solving this key management problem. But the drawback with this 
method is that it carries high overhead.  
• Pre-distribution of keys among the sensors can result in low cost key 
establishment in wireless sensor networks. But such schemes fail in handling 
security or efficiency problems. 
• Probabilistic key pre-distribution method was proposed by Eschenauer and 
Gligor [8] to establish pair-wise keys between neighboring nodes. In this method 
simple shared-key discovery protocol is used for key distribution, revocation and 
node re-keying. That is each node is preloaded witha key subset from a global 
key pool in such a way that any two neighboring nodes can share at least one 
common key with a certain probability.  But the drawb ck of this method is that 
the keys of normal nodes can be known when some nods are compromised by 
adversaries. 
• Chan, Perrig, and Song [9] proposed the q-composite random key pre-
distribution scheme, in which they modified E-G scheme by only increasing the 
number of keys that two random nodes share from at least 1 to at least q. Their 
scheme achieves good security under small scale attacks while increased 
vulnerability in large scale node to compromise attacks. 
• Du et al [10] proposed the multiple-space key pre-distribution scheme where 
each key is replaced by a special key space and many ore people came with 
certain modifications to the existing scheme. All the above methods mentioned 
so far make use of random node deployment model where each sensor node has 
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direct pair-wise keys shared with only portion of the neighbors, and depends on 
the multi hop or the path which is established in order for the nodes to 
communicate with long distance nodes. 
• Our scheme builds a dynamic Blom’s key distribution scheme to ensure secure 
communication between the nodes in the network. We also use the Mesh array 
for Matrix multiplication in order to make the schem  computation efficient. 
 
2.2 Graph Matrices 
Instead of using the Vandermonde matrix [11], the following matrices can be used as a 
pubic matrix in the Blom’s scheme. The main advantage of the following matrices is that 
they reduce the cost of saving the columns in the memory of sensor because any node can 
easily generate these matrices of known size. 
• Hadamard matrix: A non–binary Hadamard matrix is used as the public matrix 
to reduce the computation and memory overhead in Blom’s scheme [13]. A 
Hadamard Matrix is a square matrix with values 1s and -1s. It reduces the 
complexity of calculating values of all the elements corresponding to the columns 
in Vandermonde matrix. 
1 1 1 11 1 1 11 1 1 11 1 1 1  
 
Figure-1: Hadamard Matrix               
                
• Adjacency Matrix: To reduce the computation and memory overhead in Blom’s 
scheme, instead of using Vandermonde matrix, an Adjacency Matrix is used as a 
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public matrix [14]. An Adjacency Matrix is a square matrix with 1s and -0s, it 
reduces of complexity of calculating values for all the elements corresponding to 
the columns in Vandermonde matrix. This Adjacency matrix is formed in such a 
way that all nodes that are neighbors of a particular node are filled with 1s and 
remaining with q-1(since public matrix cannot contai  0s). 
1 1 0 11 0 0 00 0 1 11 0 1 0 
Figure-2: Adjacency Matrix 
 
• Incidence Matrix:  The incidence matrix of a graph gives the (0, 1) matrix which 
has a row for each vertex and column for each edge, and (v,e) = 1. For the 


















1 1 0 01 0 1 00 1 1 10 0 0 1 
Figure-4: Incidence Matrix for example graph 
0 1 1 01 0 1 01 1 0 10 0 1 0 
Figure-5: Adjacency Matrix for example graph 
2.3 Theorem for Generating Symmetric Matrix  
In Blom’s scheme, the Central authority or the base station randomly generates the 
secret key which is a symmetric matrix. Here, we obtain the secret symmetric matrix 
using the following steps: 
FOR A SQUARE MATRIX OF EVEN ORDER: 
Step-1: Consider a square matrix, 
X= 11 12 13 1421 22 23 2431 32 33 3441 42 43 44 
Step-2: Now, we take transpose of the matrix X. 
XT= 11 21 31 4112 22 32 4213 23 33 4314 24 34 44 
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This is a symmetric matrix which can be used as a Secret matrix by the Central 
Authority. Similarly, the secret matrix using non-square matrix and square matrix of 
odd order can be obtained. 
FOR DYNAMICALLY UPDATING THE SECRET MATRIX: 
In the above symmetric matrix XXT, let us assume the following: 








































So, the matrix XXT can be written as, 
              
Now, the secret symmetric matrix can be updated as follows: 
              
             or 
             +
             

 
Which is again a symmetric matrix that can be used as a secret matrix. 
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2.4 Mesh Array for matrix multiplication 
The mesh array of matrix multiplication [5][15] was introduced by Kak in 1988 to speed 
up the computation for multiplying two n×n matrices using distributed computing nodes. 
In contrast to the standard array that requires 3n-2 steps to complete its computation, the 
mesh array requires only 2n-1 steps. The speedup of the mesh array is a consequence of 
the fact that no zeros are padded in its inputs. 
In the modified Blom’s scheme, the mesh array for matrix multiplication can be used by 
the central authority or the base station for generating the private matrix and by the user 
pair in order to obtain the shared key by multiplying the public and private key.  
Consider two 4*4 matrices: 
A= 11 12 13 1421 22 23 2431 32 33 3441 42 43 44 
And 
B= 11 12 13 1421 22 23 2431 32 33 3441 42 43 44 
 





















 Figure-7: Computing node that generates c= a11b11+a12b21 
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Properties of Mesh Array for Matrix Multiplication: 
• For a matrix with odd order, the rows 2 to (n+1)/2 are mirror image to rows 
(n+3)/2 to n. 
Example: For a 5*5 matrix: 

11 22 33 44 5512 31 24 53 4532 14 51 25 4334 52 15 41 2354 35 42 13 21

 
• For a matrix with even order, the rows 2 to n/2 are mirror reversed image to rows 
n/2+2 to  n, and the middle row (n/2+1) has self-symmetry. 
Example: For a 6*6 matrix: 







2.4 Handshake Protocol: 
Cryptography is the study of techniques for the secur  communication between two 
parties even in the presence of the third party. The handshake is the process which is used 
for the process of authentication. It ensures that a secure channel is established between 
the two communicating parties before the data transfer takes place. It verifies that 
information transmitted during the session is not being monitored or diverted to a 

















Figure:8– The Handshake process 
• The handshake process is started by the authenticationg party. In step-1, the 
authenticator sends a nonce message to the supplicant. 
• In step-2, on receiving the nonce from the authenticator the supplicant 
acknowledges to the authenticator by sending a messag . 
• In step-3, the authenticator verifies the information and authenticates the 
supplicant and informs it to the supplicant by sending another nonce message say 
nonce2. 
• In step-4, on receiving nonce2, the supplicant send an acknowledgement 
message to authenticator. 






















THE BLOM SCHEME 
 
Blom’s scheme [12] is a symmetric threshold key exchange cryptography protocol. It 
allows any pair of users in the system to find a uniq e shared key for secure 
communication.  
• In this scheme, a network with N users and a collusi n of less than t+1 users 
cannot reveal the keys which are held by other users. Thus, the security of the 
network depends on the chosen value of t, which is called Blom’s secure 
parameter (t<<N).  
• Larger value of t leads to greater resilience but a very high t value increases the 
amount of memory required to store key information.   
• Generation of Public matrix: 
Initially, a central authority or base station first constructs a (t + 1)×N matrix P 
over a finite field GF(q), where N is the size of the network and q is the prime 
number. P is known to all users and it can be constructed using Vandermonde 
matrix. It can be shown that any t+1 columns of P are linearly independent when 
ni, i=1, 2,…N are all distinct. 
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 P = 

 1 1 1 … 1#1 #2 #3 … #$#1 #2 #3 … #$… . . . … … … … … … … …#& #& #& … #$& 
 
 
• Generation of Secret Key (Private matrix): 
The central authority or the base station selects a random (t + 1) × (t + 1) 
symmetric matrix S over GF (q), where S is secret and only known by the central 
authority.  
An N × (t + 1) matrix A = (S. P)T is computed which is needed for generating the 
shared key..   
 K =A.P 
     = (S. P)T. P  
         = PT. ST.P  
                 = PT.S.P  
                = (A.P)T 
                = KT 
• Generation of shared key by the user pair: 
User pair (i, j) will use Kij, the element in row i and column j in K, as the shared 
key. Because Kij is calculated by the i-th row of A and the j-th column of P, the 
central authority assigns the i-th row of A matrix and the i-th column of P matrix 
to each user i, for 1, 2….. N. Therefore, when user i and user j need to establish a 
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shared key between them, they first exchange their columns of P, and then they 
can compute Kij and Kji, respectively, using their private rows of A. It has been 
proved in [10] that the above scheme is t-secure if any t + 1 columns of G are 
linearly independent.  
• The t-secure parameter guarantees that no compromise of up to t nodes has any 
information about Kij or Kji. 
 
                       A= (S.P)T                            P                           (S.P)T P 









     

              . .     . .     &' &'   















THE PROPOSED SCHEME 
 
In original Blom’s scheme all the computations that are involved in generating the keys 
are based on a Vandermonde matrix which is a public matrix (P) and known to even the 
adversaries.The security of the network depends on the secure parameter “t”. However, 
for large values of t, number of rows in the matrix increases and which in turn 
corresponds to a greater value in the columns becaus  the column values increase in a 
geometric series.  
The proposed method makes use of the original Blom’s scheme .In the Blom’s scheme 
for any two nodes to generate a shared key, each node should store its private key and the 
public key of the other node. Since every sensor node is provided with limited memory 
and energy, it will be difficult to store both the row and column in the sensor memory for 
a large network. So, the goal is to reduce the memory and computation overhead. To 
achieve this in Blom’s scheme, instead of using Vandermonde matrix we propose the use 
any random matrix as the public matrix. The overall computation cost can also be 
reduced because the cost of generating a random matrix is less as compared to the cost of 




Now, similar to Blom’s scheme the operation which are to be performed to generate the 
keys will depend on the prime number, i.e., the number which depends on the desired key 
length. 
Following are the steps involved in calculating the s ared key using the modified Blom’s 
Scheme: 
• Generation of Public matrix: 
Initially, any random matrix of order (t+1) * (t+1) is chosen as the public matrix.  
• Generation of Secret matrix (symmetric matrix): 
The central authority calculates a (t + 1) × (t + 1) symmetric matrix S, where S is 
secret and only known by the central authority. 
• Generation of Private Matrix for obtaining the shared key: 
A N × (t + 1) matrix A = (S. P) T is computed which is used for generating the 
shared key. The base station stores each row of the matrix A in the node memory 











Bob   A David   A 





• Assigning Unique ID: The Central Authority assigns unique id’s to all the nodes 
in the network, which is public to the entire network before the public and private 
matrices are calculated. Once the node receives its un que id, it responds to the 
CA with an acknowledge type message or a reply. A question here arises, what if 
there is already an intruder in the network before assigning id’s or how to 
distinguish a new node that enters a network as a trusted node or a malicious 
node. For this reason, we assume that every node is authenticated in some other 
network before it enters this network. The following handshake takes place before 













Figure-11: New Node Authentication 
 
Verifies with the 







Asks for the authenticated network id  
And the node id issued by that network CA 
Issues a unique id to the node and again asks 
for the previous network id  
Acknowledges by sending the values 
Sends the id 
Verifies that the  







Now, if suppose Alice and Bob want to communicate with eachother, they require the 
private key from the central authority to calculate th  shared key. In order to obtain 















Figure-12: Private Key Distribution 
 
Verifies the id 
and sends the 
private key  
 
NODE CENTRAL AUTHORITY 
Request for Private key 
Acknowledges the request by 
asking for the unique id assigned 
Sends the id to the CA 
Sends private key and asks for id 
again 
Sends the id 
Verifies the id 





• The CA maintains the following intrusion table for the malicious nodes. 







Table-1: Intrusion Table 
• In any of the above steps, if the Central Authority detects any node to be 
malicious, it then updates the unique id value of that node as MN1, increments the 
intrusion count by 1, blocks all the communication in that particular path and 
multicasts it to all the nodes in the network. 
•  Generation of shared key: 
Finally user pair (Alice, Bob) can compute the shared key by multiplying the 
secret row of matrix A stored in the node with column of the public matrix 
corresponding to the node index with which it wants to communicate. The key 






Figure-13 : Shared Key Generation 
Alice   A 
Bob 




• The CA does the following handshake at regular time int rvals in order to detect 























NODE CENTRAL AUTHORITY 
Asks to send the unique id 
Acknowledges by 
sending the id assigned 
FLAG = 1 and updates the node with a new 
id and asks again for the old id value 
Sends the previous id 
value 
Verifies to check if the 
updated ID is sent to the 
trusted node and stops the 
handshake 
Verifies if the id values 





• Dynamic Secret Matrix: 
The CA dynamically updates the secret matrix in each of the following cases: 
 For every increment of the intrusion count in the intrusion table. 
 Suppose, if node i wants to communicate with node j (both i and j being 
trusted parties and not intruders). Once, the CA gives the private key to 
both the nodes, it updates the secret matrix for the next request from the 
nodes. 
• Once the shared key has been established between th odes, before the nodes 
start communicating with each other, the following handshake takes place 
between the nodes and the Central Authority in order to authenticate each other. 













Figure- 15: Node Authentication 
 
 
    Alice            CA 
IDi  + IDj  +  shared key 
FLAG = 1 + asks for the key 
value again 
    Bob 
IDj  + IDi +  shared key 
Verifies if both the shared key 
values are same 
FLAG = 1 + asks for the key 
value again 
Verifies again to ensure there 





Detection of Compromised Nodes: 
A compromised node is a trusted node that has been taken over by the attacker.The  
individual nodes of a wireless sensor network (WSN) could be easily compromised by 
the adversary due to the constraints such as limited battery lifetime, memory space and 
computing capability. It is critical to detect and isolate the compromised nodes in order to 
avoid being misled by the falsified information injected by the adversary through 
compromised nodes. The following protocol can be usd to detect the compromised 
nodes. There are five types of messages used in this protocol: 
• HELLO 
• AYT – Are You There 
• IMF – I am Fine 
• IMC – I am Captured 
• Captured 
Every node in the network sends a HELLO message packet to its neighbouring nodes 
which contains the particular unique node id assigned by the Central Authority. On 
receiving the HELLO message, the node is expected to send a corresponding HELLO 
message as an acknowledgement. Every node should run a monitoring routine which 
keeps a counter that  records the number of consecutiv ly missed HELLO messages from 
that particular neighbor. When the counter overflows the threshold of three, a probing 
AYT message is sent to the neighbor. The protocol demand that all nodes must respond 
to an AYT request. If a positive response, i.e. IMF message, is not received from that 
node after a fixed timeout, the guardian node broadcasts a Captured message and reports 





The example below shows the working of our modified Blom’s Scheme that uses a 
random matrix as public key and generates a private key. Let us consider a network with 
5 nodes and the following parameters: 
• Let C be the Central Authority or Base Station. 
• Secure parameter t = 4, which says if more than 3 nodes in the network are 
compromised, it is not possible to find the keys of other users. 






    
Figure-16: Node Structure Example 
• As the public matrix (P) should be of the order (t+1) * (t+1), P can be taken as 
any random (4+1) * (4+1) matrix. 
    











• The secret symmetric matrix can be obtained as follows: 
Let us take a random matrix, 
A= 

3 4 2 3 21 4 2 9 16 2 4 1 03 2 1 0 12 1 1 0 1

        B= 

3 1 6 3 24 4 2 2 12 2 4 1 13 9 1 0 02 1 0 1 1

 
We obtain the secret matrix S by taking the product of two matrices A and B, 
S= 

42 52 37 21 1452 103 31 14 937 31 57 26 1821 14 26 15 1014 9 18 10 7 

 
• Now, we calculate matrix A using, 
A = (S.P) T mod q 
(S.P)T = 





A= (S.P) T mod 53 = 





Once A is calculated, each sensor node memory is filled with unique row chosen 
from A with corresponding index. These are the private keys for the nodes. 
• Now, for the key generation, we need the public andprivate keys of the nodes.  




generate the shared secret key, Bob should multiply the private key given by the 





Figure-11: Public and private key for an example pair
 
Figure-17 : Public and Private keys 
K Bob, Charlie = ABob. PCharlie = .29 1 42 46 34/ 
31300

  = 214 mod 53 = 2 
K Charlie, Bob = ACharlie. PBob = .24 34 48 49 52/ 
21413

 = 479 mod 53 = 2 
As seen above, both the nodes generate a common key and further communication can be 
done using the shared key generated. 
Let us assume the following:  





















Bob – 2 
Charlie – 3 
David – 4 
Emma - 5 






































































































































.16 46 52 11 8/ 6 
Table-2: Key Generation for all nodes 
















52 72 58 43 2772 133 43 27 2358 43 107 41 3443 27 41 85 2727 23 34 27 97

 
The Private matrix A can be calculated as, 
A= (S.P) T mod q 
A = 

589 722 646 453 773532 545 730 443 531402 478 538 279 206793 843 755 1045 591460 586 515 395 316

 Mod 53 
A = 

 6 33 10 29 312 15 41 19 131 1 8 14 4751 48 13 38 836 3 38 14 51

 
Now, suppose Bob and Alice wants to communicate with each other. 




      = 207 mod 53  




KBob, Alice = ABob. PAlice 




      = 154 mod 53 
      = 48 
 Both the nodes generate a common key and further communication can be done using 
the shared key generated.  
Hence, by randomly updating the secret matrix, the Central Authority makes sure that the 








SIMULATION AND RESULTS 
 
The main drawbacks of Blom’s scheme are memory overhead and computation overhead. 
This paper analyzes the ways to overcome these drawbacks. The modified Blom’s 
scheme proposes the use of random matrix as the public matrix instead of the 
Vandermonde matrix. This reduces the computational complexity corresponding to the 
columns in Vandermonde matrix.In this paper, we have performed an analysis between 
the original Blom’s scheme and the proposed Blom’s scheme with respect to 
computational effort. Different simulations have been made to a node size of 2,4,6, 
8,10,20,30,40,50,100 and 200.  Also, the Blom’s scheme is made dynamic by changing 
the values of the secret matrix in order to protect he network from the malicious nodes. 
Different handshakes have been introduced so that the Central Authority can monitor the 
network at regular intervals. 
The results of the simulation show that the computation l complexity of the modified 




The time complexity of obtaining different matrices like the Hadamard matrix, 
Adjacency matrix and the complexity of obtaining the random matrix is calculated and 
the following results have been obtained: 
For a given number n, where n is the number of nodes in the network, the time taken to 
generate a random matrix of order n has the plot shown below. The random matrix can be 
generated by using the below equation. 
r = ceil((k-l).*rand(n,n) + l); 
 
  Figure:18 - Time Complexity for obtaining Random Matrix 
The time taken to generate adjacency matrix for graphs with different node sizes  





Figure:19- Time Complexity for obtaining Adjacency Matrix 
For different values of n, where n is the order of the matrix, the time varying time taken 
to generate a hadamard matrix is shown below. 
 





Figure: 21- Comparision of Time complexity for Adjacency and a Random Matrix 
 




Also, the matrix multiplication complexity has been compared between the original 
scheme and the proposed scheme. The original scheme requires (3n-2) steps to complete 
the matrix multiplication where as the proposed scheme completes the computation in 









Figure-24: Matrix Multiplication complexity for proposed scheme 





Hence, the computational complexity can further be educed by using any random public 
matrix instead of the Vandermonde matrix as in the original scheme and the efficiency of 
the original scheme can be improved by making the sc me dynamic. The Vandermonde 
matrix can be generated by using: 
A = vander(v); fliplr(A);  ,where v is the order ofthe matrix. 
 
Figure-26: Computational Effort for Original Blom’s Scheme 
 





Figure-28: Comparison of the Computational Effort f the original and proposed scheme 
Hence, from the above results,  it can be observed that the computational effort required 
by the proposed scheme is less as compared to that f the original scheme. Moreover, this 























Key Management is an important issue in wireless networks. For any network, in order to 
ensure secure data transmission between the nodes, Authentication and confidentiality 
play a major role. Blom’s scheme is a symmetric keymanagement scheme that allows 
users to find a shared key for secure communication. Its drawbacks include 
computational and memory overhead. 
The proposed scheme overcomes the drawbacks of the Blom’s scheme using Random 
matrix and provides different ways to protect the ntwork from malicious nodes. 
Different Handshake protocols have been introduced for the purpose of authentication 
and confidentiality. A more generic and dynamic algorithm from a scalability point of 
view is developed.  
Also, simulations are carried out for different node sizes and is analyzed from the 
computational complexity point of view. We have shown how the protocols proposed for 
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